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CHILDREN: CHATTELS TO CHUMS-
SHOCKLEY V. PRIER
In Shockley v. Prier,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court became
the first court in the country to squarely confront the question
of whether parents can recover damages for the loss of society
and companionship of an injured minor child. The purpose of
this comment is to analyze the Shockley decision and the state
of the law in the other six jurisdictions in which such a recovery
is allowed.2
I. BACKGROUND
Recovery for loss of society and companionship is not new
in the law generally or in Wisconsin, but the severe limitations
on its application have until recently effectively made the hus-
band the only person who could recover for such a loss in cases
of personal injury. Even the Wrongful Death Statute,3 which
was enacted in 1857,1 did not recognize the right of recovery for
1. 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975). In Shockley the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin established a rule which allows parents of an injured minor child to recover
for the loss of the society and companionship of the child during the period of the
child's minority if the parents join their suit for damages with that of the child.
2. Washington and Iowa by statute and Illinois, Idaho, Florida and California by
court decision.
3. Wis. STAT. § 895.03 (1973).
4. Wis. Laws 1857, ch. 71:
The people of the State of Wisconsin, represented in Senate and Assembly,
do enact as follows:
s.1. That whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act,
neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had
not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damage in respect thereof; then and in every such case, the person who, or the
corporation which would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be
liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured,
and although the death may have been occasioned under such circumstances
as constitute an indictable offense; Provided, That such action shall be brought
for a death caused in this State, and in some court established by the constitu-
tion and laws of the same.
s.2. Every such action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal
representative of such deceased person; and the amount recovered shall belong
and be paid over to the husband or widow of such deceased person, if such
relative survive him or her; but if no husband or widow survive the deceased,
the amount recovered shall be paid over to his or her lineal descendants, and to
his or her lineal ancestors in default of such descendants; and in every such
action the jury may give such damages, not exceeding $5,000, as they shall deem
fair and just in reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death to
the relatives of the deceased specified in this section; Provided, Every such
action shall be commenced within two years after the death of such deceased
person.
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loss of society and companionship until it was amended in
1931- to allow recovery of up to $2500 for such loss.' Prior to
that time, recovery was expressly limited by the statute to
pecuniary loss, with maximum recoveries that varied over the
years until the limit was removed in 1971. 7
At common law, recovery was allowed only for loss of a
wife's consortium.8 Wisconsin altered that rule in 1967 in
Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co.9 to allow a wife to
recover for loss of her husband's consortium.
In Shockley, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has taken an-
other step toward full recognition of the value of familial rela-
tionships by allowing parents to recover for the loss of society
and companionship of their injured minor child.
I. SHOCKLEY V. PRIER
The Shockley case was a suit by a minor and his parents
to recover damages sustained by all three as a result of the
alleged negligence of two doctors and a hospital. The child,
Paul Shockley, was given an excessive amount of oxygen
shortly after birth which, according to the complaint, caused
retrolental fibroplasia resulting in blindness. The complaint
sought damages on behalf of the child, but that cause of action
was not involved in the appeal. In addition, it set forth a cause
of action on behalf of the parents seeking recovery of damages
for, among other things, the loss of the child's "'aid, comfort,
society and companionship.'"10 A demurrer to the parents'
complaint was sustained and an appeal was taken from that
order.
Justice Day defined the scope of the opinion and the ques-
tion confronting the court: "We therefore confine this opinion
5. Wis. Laws 1931, ch. 263 § 2:
The people of the state of Wisconsin, represented in senate and assembly, do
enact as follows:
Section 1. Section 331.04 of the statutes is amended to read:
(2) In addition to the benefits provided for in subsection (1), a sum not
exceeding twenty-five hundred dollars for loss of society and companionship
shall accrue to the parent or parents or husband or wife of the deceased.
6. Now increased to $5,000 by Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 436.
7. Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 59.
8. Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542 at 546, 150 N.W.2d
137 at 138 (1967); Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d at 397, 225 N.W.2d at 497 (1975).
9. 34 Wis. 2d at 558, 150 N.W.2d at 145.
10. 66 Wis. 2d at 395, 225 N.W.2d at 497, quoting from the complaint.
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to the question of whether such damages are allowable to a
parent during the minority of an injured child."'"
The opinion also discussed the fifty year old common law
rule, then in effect in Wisconsin,12 which allowed the parents
of an injured minor child to recover for the loss of the child's
wages or earning capacity during minority (referred to as "serv-
ices" by some courts), and for reasonable medical and nursing
expenses incurred in effecting the child's cure.
The court cited authority on its power to change the com-
mon law, focusing particularly on tort cases concerning the
family relationship. Noted in this review was Moran v. Quality
Aluminum Casting Co.13 The court also noted the ruling in
Goller v. White 4 that abrogated the common law tort immun-
ity between parent and child. After this review, the court
stated the fallacy in the modern application of what had once
been the primary theory and ground of recovery for parents of
an injured child - the concept of a child as an economic asset
whose injury cdused pecuniary loss to the parents and family:
In the majority of family situations, children are no longer
an economic asset but on the contrary are usually sources of
great expenditure on the part of parents. Wisconsin's lower-
ing of the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen years
has made the possibility of a parent acquiring the earnings
of a child even more remote.'5
This statement was followed by citation of cases 6 and com-
mentators' 7 for the following conclusion:
The 'remedy' of loss of minor's earning capacity during
minority is of diminishing significance. Since our court last
11. Id. at 396, 225 N.W.2d at 497.
12. Id. at 396-97, 225 N.W.2d at 497:
There is no statute defining what damages may be recovered by a parent for
injuries to a child. The law in that area is common law and was enunciated 50
years ago in the case of Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., (1925), 188 Wis. 376,
380, 206 N.W. 198. In that case, this court said:
"But when a minor child is injured by the negligence of another. . . the
parent can recover (1) for loss of the minor's earning capacity during
minority and (2) for reasonable medical and nursing expenses during
minority."
13. 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967).
14. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
15. 66 Wis. 2d at 399, 225 N.W.2d at 498.
16. Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967).
17. 43 WASH. L. REv. 654 (1967); Katz, Schroeder and Sidman, Emancipating Our
Children - Coming of Legal Age in America, 7 FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY 211 (1973).
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
laid down the rule in 1925, the family relationship has
changed. Society and companionship between parents and
their children are closer to our present day family ideal than
the right of parents to the 'earning capacity during minority,'
which once seemed so important when the common law was
originally established.
In the case at bar one needs little imagination to see the
shattering effect that Paul's blindness will have on the rela-
tionship between him and his parents. The loss of the enjoy-
ment of those experiences normally shared by parents and
children need no enumeration here.
We conclude that the law should recognize the right of
parents to recover for loss of aid, comfort, society and com-
panionship of a child during minority when such loss is
caused by the negligence of another.'"
For practical implementation, the court suggested two pres-
ently used jury instructions as models for this type of case. 9
18. 66 Wis. 2d at 400-01, 225 N.W.2d at 499.
19. WIS. JI - CIVIL:
1895 Death of Child: Parent's Loss of Society and Companionship
Subdivision - of Question - makes inquiry as to what sum will reasonably
compensate the plaintiff (father) (mother) for loss of society and companion-
ship of the child.
You will carefully consider all of the credible evidence and reasonable infer-
ences therefrom, bearing on this inquiry, and in answer, name such sum as will
fairly and reasonably compensate (him)(her) for the loss of the society and
companionship of (his)(her) deceased (son)(daughter).
You should take into consideration the ages of both the deceased child and
the parent. You should also consider the relationship of the parent and the child;
the love and affection and conduct of each towards the other; the society and
companionship that was afforded to the parent by the child; the personality,
disposition, and character of the child; the disposition and susceptibility of the
parent to suffer from such loss; and name an amount which will in your judg-
ment reasonably compensate the parent for such loss as (he) (she) sustained by
being deprived of such society and companionship as the child afforded (him)
(her) during (his) (her) lifetime and which you are reasonably certain would have
continued during the natural life of the parent except for the death of the child.
1816 Injury to Husband: Services, Society, and Companionship: Past and
Future
In answer to Question - with respect to loss of services, society, and
companionship of her husband, your should name such sum as you feel will
fairly and reasonably compensate (name) for such loss as she has sustained by
being deprived of his aid, assistance, comfort, society and companionship during
such period as he was unable to render such services because of his injuries. In
considering the amount to be awarded, you will bear in mind the evidence as to
the relationship which existed between the husband and wife before his injury.
If you are satisfied to a reasonable certainty that for any appreciable time
in the future he will be unable to render such services and/or provide such
[Vol. 59
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Wisconsin Jury Instructions - Civil, Section 1895 is used in
Wisconsin wrongful death cases involving children and sug-
gests the following factors for consideration by a jury: (1) the
ages of the child and parent(s); (2) the relationship of the par-
ent and child; (3) the love, affection and conduct of each to-
ward the other; (4) the society and companionship afforded the
parent by the child; (5) the disposition and susceptibility of the
parents to suffer from the loss. Wisconsin Jury Instructions -
Civil, Section 1819 deals with the loss of society suffered by a
wife when her husband is injured. It suggests wording appropri-
ate for determining past and future loss of society and compan-
ionship by asking the jury to consider an award to the wife for
injuries she "has" suffered and, if the disability of her husband
still exists, to make an award for future loss "for the period
such disability will exist." A combination of the appropriate
sections of these two instructions might give an instruction,
and a list of the appropriate elements of proof, as follows:
Injury to Child: Parents' Loss of Society and Companionship
Subdivision __ of Question - makes inquiry as to what
sum will reasonably compensate the plaintiff (father)
(mother) for loss of society and companionship of the child.
You will carefully consider all of the credible evidence and
the inferences therefrom, bearing on this inquiry, and in an-
swer, name such sum as will fairly compensate (him)(her)
(them) for the loss (he) (she) (they) (has) (have) sustained by
being deprived of the aid, comfort, society and companion-
ship of (his) (her) (their) child during such time as the child
was unable to render such services due to (his) (her) injuries.
If you are satisfied to a reasonable certainty that for any
appreciable time in the future (he)(she) will be unable to
render such services and/or provide such aid, comfort, society
and companionship, you should make allowance therefor for
the period such disability will exist up until, but no longer
than, the time the child reaches (his)(her) majority.
You should take into consideration the ages of both the
injured child and the parent(s). You should also consider the
relationship of the parent and child; the love and affection
and conduct of each towards the other; the society and com-
society and companionship, you should make a proper allowance therefor for the
period such disability will exist.
You will not include in your finding any sum, which you are required to
determine in any other question, representing loss of earning capacity sustained
by (name), the husband, by reason of his injuries. To do so would be to allow
double damages for such loss of earning capacity, which you must not do.
1976]
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panionship that was or may, in the case of future disability,
be afforded to the parent by the child; the disposition and
susceptibility of the parent to suffer from such loss.
The court closed its opinion by making the new rule applic-
able only to cases of action arising on or after February 4, 1975,
the filing date of the opinion, excepting the case at bar. An
important condition was also attached to the parents' right to
bring suit:
In summary, this court concludes that a parent may
maintain an action for loss of aid, comfort, society and com-
panionship of an injured minor child against a negligent tort-
feasor provided, and on the condition, that the parent's cause
of action is combined with that of the child for the child's
personal injuries. 21
III. QUABRE
In Shockley, as in the cases of other states in which recovery
is allowed for loss of society and companionship, the injuries
to the child have been relatively severe. There is no limitation
in Shockley, however, on either the type of injury that will
cause a compensable loss of society and companionship or on
the amount of recovery. Presumably this is a question for the
jury based upon proof submitted at trial, and the court has
held that difficulty in determining damages will not relieve a
jury of the burden." Even so, the room for speculation is great,
especially in cases of serious or permanent injury to a very
young child.
For instance, the elements to be considered by a jury in
determining parents' recovery under Shockley may be present
and capable of relatively clear proof when an older child is
injured. In such cases, the relationship between the parent and
child has been subject to observation and development. The
love and affection or lack of it, displayed by each for the other
will have been manifested to persons who know the individuals.
Based on their testimony, the jury can make a rational deter-
mination of the value of the society and companionship of the
child to the parent and fix a sum compensating them. The
situation is not unlike that in which a spouse attempts to re-
cover for loss of consortium. There is an established relation-
20. 66 Wis. 2d at 404, 225 N.W.2d at 501.
21. Cameron v. Union Automobile, Inc., 210 Wis. 659, 246 N.W. 420 (1933).
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ship capable of at least some objective proof to afford a jury a
basis for determining the proper compensation for any loss suf-
fered.
On the other hand, when the child is very young, as in
Shockley, and no substantial relationship has been established
between parent and child, the problem is considerably more
difficult. This is especially true in the case of very serious and
permanent injury, where the relationship will never develop as
it might otherwise have. In a situation like Shockley, the rela-
tionship of the parent and child is largely one-sided. The only
matters capable of substantial proof are the relationship of the
parent toward the child, the love and affection of the parent
toward the child, and the conduct of the parent toward the
child. While this has a bearing on the likelihood that the parent
will suffer from the loss of the child's society, it is no proof of
the character of the relationship flowing in the opposite direc-
tion, the very thing for which the parent seeks to be compen-
sated. While the example presented here is extreme and the
problem tends to diminish as the child grows older, the prob-
lem of speculation and sympathy playing a great role in some
verdicts remains and must be dealt with.
In death cases, the problem has been mitigated to a certain
extent under the Wrongful Death Statute, which limits the
maximum recovery for loss of society and companionship. 2 A
persuasive argument could be made for limiting the maximum
recovery for loss of society and companionship in personal in-
jury cases to the $5,000 maximum set in the Wrongful Death
Statute. Unless the court reconsiders its position on this point,
such a possibility is foreclosed except by legislative action:
The right recognized in this decision may be enlarged by
the legislature, as was done by the Washington legislature
following the decision in Lockhart v. Besel, supra, or it may
abolish the cause of action or may limit the amount recovera-
ble, as it has in the wrongful death statute.?
This statement leaves the question of potential damage re-
coveries wide open. Why, though, should a parent be allowed
to recover more for the loss of an injured child's society than
for the society of a child who is killed? Does the court intend
to allow the parents of an injured child to recover more because
22. Wis. STAT. § 895.04(4) (1973).
23. 66 Wis. 2d at 403-04, 225 N.W.2d at 501.
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
they must live with, view and experience the effects of the
injuries? If that is the court's feeling, it made no expression to
that effect. Indeed, if that is what the court intends, it has gone
considerably further than any other court. In Lockhart v.
Besel,2 14 cited by Mr. Justice Day in his opinion in Shockley, the
court expressly limited the rule of recovery to loss of the child's
society and companionship and held that the award should be
made "without giving any consideration for grief, mental an-
guish or suffering of the parents. '25 The same rule was applied
in similar cases in Idaho,'2 Florida," and California.2 8 For now,
the question of damages is completely open, and lawyers and
the courts must keep constantly in mind the great possibility
for verdicts based on jury speculation and sympathy in all
cases where recovery for loss of a child's society is sought. Vigi-
lance is most important in cases like Shockley, where the child
is very young and there is little or no objective relationship on
which to base an award.
A procedural question that arises is the application of the
statute of limitations to the parents' cause of action for loss of
a child's society in view of the requirement that they join their
suit for damages with that of the child. Is their cause of action
barred after three years, as is normally the case in actions
based on personal injuries, 2 or is it governed by the statute
applicable to a minor's cause of action?"0 That is, may they
bring their suit with the child at any time until a year after the
child reaches majority?
There is no statement by the court in Shockley as to the
nature of the parents' cause of action for this purpose. An anal-
ogy may be drawn to the situation in White v. Lunder,31 where
the court held that the cause of action of one spouse for loss of
consortium is derivative in nature for purposes of applying the
comparative negligence statute, and thus subject to the defen-
ses which may be interposed against the injured spouse.2 There
24. 71 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967).
25. Id. at -, 426 P.2d at 609.
26. Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415 at -, 242 P.2d 971 at 977-78 (1952).
27. City Stores Co. v. Langer, 308 So.2d 621, 622 (Fla. App. 1975).
28. Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 542, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639, 641-
42 (1975).
29. Wis. STAT. § 893.205 (1973).
30. Wis. STAT. § 893.33 (1973).
31. 66 Wis.2d 563, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975).
32. Id. at 574, 225 N.W.2d at 449.
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is no apparent reason why the parents' cause of action under
Shockley is not also derivative. If this is the case, it could be
argued that the same rule should be applied for purposes of
determining the statute of limitations, and that the parents'
cause of action, which must be joined with the child's under
Shockley,3 may be so joined at any time within which the child
may bring suit. On the other hand, holding that the three-year
statute is applicable to the parents' suit, and thus forcing the
child to litigate to preserve the parents' rights, would thwart
the intent of the law to allow the child to bring suit until a year
after reaching majority. 4 Such action may be detrimental to
the child where the full extent of compensable injuries are not
known until after attaining majority age. To the contrary, it
might be said that policy dictates allowing as few claims of long
duration as possible, thus favoring application of the three year
statute. The court's direction is currently unclear. Counsel on
both sides should be aware of the issue.
Another most interesting question raised by the Shockley
decision is its potential extension to other family relationships.
If a parent can recover for loss of a child's society, why not
allow recovery in the opposite situation? Nowhere in Shockley
is the possibility of a child's recovery for loss of a parent's
society and companionship excluded. The loss to the child in
some cases might be greater than the loss to the parent when
the child suffers injury. This is particularly true when the po-
tential for learning and personal growth afforded the child by
association with his or her parents is considered. The Wiscon-
sin Wrongful Death Statute recognizes the right of a child to
recover such damages 35 and it would seem, in light of Shockley,
that there is no longer any logical basis for denying recovery in
personal injury cases. The same argument holds true for broth-
ers and sisters. Siblings are often in each other's company more
than in the company of their parents. When a child is injured,
it is as clear that his or her brothers and sisters stand to suffer
loss just as the parents do. Again, recovery is recognized by the
Wrongful Death Statute,36 and there would seem no more logi-
cal basis for denying recovery in this situation than when a
parent is injured.
33. 66 Wis. 2d at 404, 225 N.W.2d at 501.
34. Wis. STAT. § 893.33 (1973).
35. Wis. STAT. § 893.04 (1973).
36. Id.
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The argument can be extended up and down the family tree
ad infinitum and a policy determination would have to be
made to cut off recovery at some point. There does not seem
to be any good reason, however, why recovery for loss of society
of an injured person could not be extended within the nuclear
family unit. Such recovery is expressly allowed under the
Wrongful Death Statute in Wisconsin, and it would seem no
less capable of proof in cases of personal injury than in cases
of wrongful death.
Notwithstanding the potential problems, the Shockley de-
cision is a good one. It recognizes the real contribution of a
child to the family and removes the child from the servant
category shared so long with the wife. Wisconsin now considers
the child an individual whose presence and relationship has
intrinsic value to the family. The real value of the decision,
however, lies in the court's reasoning and analysis. As will be
shown, the cases preceding Shockley in other states often failed
to discuss the policy of the rule. In some cases, the rule seems
to have been set by a slip of the judicial quill and followed
without comment.
IV. RECOVERY BY STATUTE
Washington and Iowa are the only states which allow statu-
tory recovery for loss of society and companionship of an in-
jured minor child. Each had well reasoned decisions allowing
such recovery in cases of wrongful death of a child which were
followed by legislative action modifying the pertinent statute
to allow recovery in cases of injury as well.
A. Washington
The Washington Supreme Court, in Lockhart v. Besel,37
construed their statute giving parents a cause of action for the
injury or death of a minor child" to include a recovery for the
loss of the child's society and companionship. In Lockhart the
plaintiffs son, a high school senior, was killed in a collision
37. Id.
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1965):
Action for injury or death of child.
A father, or in case of his death or desertion of his family, the mother may
maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of a minor child, or a child
on whom either is dependent for support, and the mother for the injury or death
of an illegitimate minor child, or an illegitimate child on whom she is dependent
for support.
[Vol. 59
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with the defendant's auto as the defendant was passing another
car. The evidence indicated that the young man was a good
student, an athlete, and "a leader in his class." He helped his
father with a hog raising business and janitorial work at a local
school, both of which the father had to give up after the boy's
death. Judgment was for the parents who appealed, claiming
that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that
"'[y]ou may also consider the loss of companionship to the
parents occasioned by the death of said child.' -
The parents admitted that the instruction was a departure
from the then existing rule which, they contended, ". . . fails
to recognize that economic benefit from children is no longer a
matter of parental concern, and that the modern parental atti-
tude is one of sacrifice for the success of children."" The law
in Washington at that time limited the damages recoverable by
a parent to "pecuniary" loss resulting from a child's injuries.
The court noted that the argument had been advanced that in
the absence of special proof it was "speculative to say that the
earnings of a minor child exceed the cost of his support."4 The
court agreed, stating "[w]e must now conclude that to award
more than nominal damages in every case where we limit dam-
age to the loss of a minor child's earnings above the cost of his
support and maintenance, is an affront to reason and logic."4
The issue was resolved thus:
We hold that the measure of damages under RCW 4.24.010,
supra, should be extended to include the loss of companion-
ship of a minor child during his minority without giving any
consideration for grief, mental anguish or suffering of the
parents by reason of such child's wrongful death.43
The case was remanded for a new trial on all issues.
Lockhart was couched in terms of wrongful death and, argu-
ably, that was the extent of its application. The point was
clarified by the Washington legislature in 1967 when it
amended the Washington Revised Code to allow the recovery
of damages for loss of society and companionship of an injured
child just as in wrongful death cases.44
39. 71 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967).
40. Id. at ., 426 P.2d at 607.
41. Id. at , 426 P.2d at 607.
42. Id. at..., 426 P.2d at 608.
43. Id. at , 426 P.2d at 609.
44. Id. at , 426 P.2d at 609.
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B. Iowa
Until 1971, Rule 8 of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure
allowed a father to recover for medical expenses and "actual"
loss of services resulting from the death of or injury to a child."
In 1971, the Iowa Supreme Court decided the case of Wardlow
v. City of Keokuk,4" in which the parents were allowed to re-
cover for the loss of society and companionship of their four
deceased children. The children drowned when they were swept
into a storm sewer owned by the City of Keokuk. The trial court
struck claims of the parents for (1) loss of society, companion-
ship and affection of their children and (2) for mental anguish
suffered by them as a result of the death of the children. The
parents appealed. Refering to the Lockhart decision,47 the court
noted: "[t]he statute considered in Lockhart created a right
of action for injury or death of a minor child but prescribed no
measure of recovery. It differs from Rule 8, RCP, in this re-
spect."4" Nevertheless, the court concluded, after a review of
the authorities on the wrongful death of children:
The pronouncements in Fussner v. Andert [(1962), 261 Minn
347, 113 N.W. 2d 355] and Lockhart v. Besel, both supra,
support our conclusion that to hold no recovery beyond nomi-
nal damages plus medical and funeral bills can be had in
actions for wrongful death when there is competent substan-
tial evidence in the record of loss of companionship and so-
45. WASH. REV. CODE. § 4.24.010 (1974):
The mother or father or both may maintain an action as plaintiff for the
injury or death of a minor child, or a child on whom either, or both, are depen-
dent for support: Provided, That in the case of an illegitimate child the father
cannot maintain or join as a party an action unless paternity has been duly
established and the father has regularly contributed to the child's support.
In such an action, in addition to damages for medical, hospital, medication
expenses, and loss of services and support, damages may be recovered for the
loss of love and companionship of the child and for injury to or destruction of
the parent-child relationship in such amount as, under all the circumstances of
the case, may be just. (Amended by Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1967 ch. 81 s. 1; Laws
1st Ex. Sess. 1973 ch. 154 s. 4.)
46. IowA CODE ANN. R.C.P. 8:
Injury or Death of Minor
A father, or if he be dead, imprisoned or has deserted the family, then the
mother, may sue for the expense and actual loss of services resulting from injury
to or death of a minor child.
[Report 1943].
47. 190 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1971).
48. Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967).
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ciety of a deceased minor would render nugatory Rule 8
granting the father a cause of action for the death of his
deceased unemancipated minor child.
Rule 8, insofar as it provides a remedy for wrongful death,
is remedial in character and it is the court's duty to construe
it in the light of current social conditions. 9
The court held that in wrongful death cases involving minor
children brought under Rule 8, RCP, the jury could consider
"loss of companionship and society of the minor during his
minority" but that they could not include "grief, mental an-
guish or suffering of the parents by reason of such child's
wrongful death." 50
In 1973, the Iowa General Assembly followed the lead of the
Washington legislature and amended Rule 8, RCP, to read as
follows:
Rule 8. Injury or Death of A Minor
A parent, or the parents, may sue for the expense and
actual loss of services, companionship and society resulting
from injury to or death of a minor child.'
V. RECOVERY BY CASE LAW
Illinois, Idaho, Florida and California allow the recovery of
damages for the loss of society and companionship of an injured
minor child by court decision. In reading the cases, however,
it is apparent that the rule evolved more by accident than by
design.
A. Illinois
In Illinois, the rule is based on Stephens v. Weigel,52 a deci-
sion of the Illinois Court of Appeals. The case involved personal
injuries to a child and her mother while they were passengers
in a car driven by the defendant, Weigel. The girl, through her
father, and her father in his own right, brought suit to recover
their respective damages. The primary issue in the case was the
application of the Illinois Guest Statute and whether the defen-
dant's conduct could be classed as "wilful and wanton," thus
negating statutory control. The trial court held that the con-
49. Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439 at 445 (Iowa 1971).
50. Id. at 448.
51. Id.
52. Adopted by Acts 1973 (65 G.A.) ch. 316; IOWA CODE ANN. R.C.P. 8.
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duct of the defendant was such as to deny him the protection
of the statute and submitted the question to the jury with an
instruction that included as an element of the father's damages
"the loss of the services and society of his wife and daughter."53
On appeal from a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs,
the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the finding on the ap-
plication of the Guest Statute, stating as follows in reference
to the father's recovery:
Inasmuch as plaintiffs Ruth Stephens [the wife] and Max-
ine Stephens [the daughter] are not barred under the Guest
Statute from recovering damages for personal injuries sus-
tained by them the plaintiff Howard Stephens, as father of
Maxine and husband of Ruth, is properly entitled to assert a
claim for consequential damages arising from his payment of
medical and hospital expenses, and for the loss of the services
and society of his wife and daughter. 4
Thus the rule was established in Illinois. The court made
the statement without any discussion or citation of authority.
B. Idaho
In the Idaho case of Hayward v. Yost" a somewhat different
situation created a similar result. In that case, the Idaho Su-
preme Court extended the rule of recovery for the wrongful
death of a child, stated in Checketts v. Bowman,56 to include
cases of negligent injury.
In the Hayward case a minor, through his father, and his
parents in their own right brought suit against the driver of a
car which struck the seven year old boy. The jury returned a
verdict for the parents and the son. On appeal, issues were
raised regarding the alleged agency between the driver of the
car, a man named Speer, and the co-defendants Yost and his
business partner. A finding of insufficient evidence to support
the allegation of agency resulted in reversal and dismissal of
both verdicts against the partnership. The verdict for the par-
ents against Speer, the driver, was reversed and remanded for
a new trial, on the grounds of error in the jury instructions. The
verdict for the child against Speer individually was affirmed.
53. 336 Ill. App. 36, 82 N.E.2d 697 (1948).
54. Id. at 42, 82 N.E.2d at 700.
55. Id. at 41-42, 82 N.E.2d at 700.
56. 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952).
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The defendants argued that the damages of $10,000 for the
boy and $3,605 for the parents, which included $605 in medical
expenses, were excessive. After discussing the extent of the
boy's injuries the court stated:
The parents may maintain an action for the injury of a
minor child. Sec. 5-310, Idaho Code; in every such action
damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the
case may be just. Sec. 5-311, Idaho Code. Elements which
enter into the determination of such damages include contri-
butions which the parents might reasonably have expected to
receive from the earnings of such minor child until his major-
ity, for which there is no precise measure, Richmond v.
Moore, 103 Cal. App. 173, 284 P. 681, as well as the loss of
protection, comfort, society and companionship. Checketts v.
Bowman, 70 Idaho 463, 220 P.2d 682. 51
Neither verdict was held to be excessive, but the jury in-
structions which had permitted the jury to consider the the
parents' "worry or mental distress" were held prejudicial. 8
The case of Checketts v. Bowman,59 cited as authority for
the recovery in Hayward v. Yost, was a wrongful death case not
involving tortious injury to a child. There, a nine year old child
was killed while attempting to cross a highway. The jury re-
turned a verdict of $40,000 for the parents. They appealed from
the order of the trial court granting the defendants a new trial
on the grounds of an excessive verdict. After noting that the
applicable section of the statutes allowed for recovery of such
damages "'as under all the circumstances of the case may be
just,'"60 the court listed the traditional elements of damages
and included ". . . comfort, society and companionship de-
ceased would have afforded them had he lived. Golden v. Spo-
kane and I.E.R. Co., 20 Idaho 526, 118 P. 1076."1 No other
discussion of policy was made, and the judgment was affirmed
on the condition of remittitur of $20,000, held to be the amount
of the excess in the verdict.
The Checketts" court simply cited the Golden case 3 as au-
57. 70 Idaho 463, 220 P.2d 682 (1950).
58. Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho at -, 242 P.2d at 977.
59. Id. at ., 242 P.2d at 978.
60. 70 Idaho 463, 220 P.2d 682 (1950).
61. IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1974).
62. Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho at -, 220 P.2d at 683.
63. 20 Idaho 526, 118 P. 1076 (1911).
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thority for allowing the recovery of damages for loss of a de-
ceased child's society and companionship. The court in Golden
merely affirmed a verdict rendered in a suit brought under a
complaint in which such damages were sought under the gen-
eral heading of "services." The decision is very unclear on the
point, but clarification was provided in the Checketts case
where the recovery for loss of society of a deceased child's so-
ciety and companionship was allowed. This rule was subse-
quently extended by Hayward to include tortious injury which,
as has been pointed out, stands as the law in Idaho today.
C. Florida
The oldest case in the country to allow parents to recover
for the loss of their injured child's society and companionship
is Wilkie v. Roberts,64 decided by the Florida Supreme Court
in 1926. In that case, a ten year old boy was struck and seri-
ously injured by a truck driven by the defendant, Wilkie. Judg-
ment for the plaintiff was appealed on the grounds that the
verdict was not sustained by the evidence. The Florida court
agreed, finding that there was no evidence as to "the value of
the services of Waller Roberts to his father" and ordered a new
trial. In discussing the elements of damages recoverable by a
parent the court was, like the courts of other states, unclear. It
first stated that there was a statute allowing recovery of "loss
of services and mental pain in the event of the death of a minor
child" but none in cases of injury. It concluded that the
plaintiff-father's recovery must be based on common law65 and
continued:
The common law recognized no right of civil action for
causing the death of a human being; such right, as it now
exists in the various states of the Union, being purely statu-
tory, and is not based on the right to the child's services. The
father's right to custody, companionship, services, and earn-
ings of his minor child are valuable rights consituting a spec-
ies of property in the father, a wrongful injury to which by a
third person will support an action in favor of the father. This
is in addition to the right of action the child may have for the
personal injury received, with the resulting pain, disfigure-
ment, or permanent disability if such results follow. 20
R.D.L. 614.16 [Emphasis added.]
64. 91 Fla. 1064, 109 So. 225 (1926).
65. Id. at , 109 So. at 227.
66. Id. at , 109 So. at 227.
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The court defined the child's personal cause of action and then
described the parents' cause of action:
He could recover [under common law] only his pecuniary
loss as a result of the injury, and such loss was limited to two
elements: (1) the loss of the child's services and earnings,
present and prospective, to the end of the minority; and (2)
medical expenses in effecting or attempting to effect a cure.6"
The two statements are prima facie inconsistent in that the
first refers to "companionship" as an aspect of the compensa-
ble injury and the second reiterates the traditional elements of
recovery. The court stressed the "services" aspect in its opin-
ion, reversing for lack of proof on the value of the lost "serv-
ices.""8
Just as the opinion in the Wilkie case was equivocal, so too
were subsequent cases. In 1956, the Florida court considered
the case of Youngblood v. Taylor,69 in which a father sought to
recover damages for injuries to his son. The primary issue on
appeal was whether a father who brought suit on behalf of his
son to recover for the personal injuries to the boy could later
bring suit separately for his own damages. The defendants
argued estoppel, and the trial court agreed. The supreme court
reversed that decision and touched on the issue of damages in
passing, stating that "[t]he father could recover for loss of the
child's services and earnings and for medical expenses incurred
in treatment of the child's injuries." 0 Wilkie v. Roberts was
cited specifically for the proposition that the father's cause of
action was independent of the child's and, apparently, as gen-
eral authority for the above quoted damages rule.
In 1973, the court took another swing at the rule in Yordon
v. Savage.71 In that case, a child and his parents brought a
three count complaint against a pediatrician for treatment al-
legedly resulting in the child's blindness. The first was for the
child's own damages; the second by the parents jointly for their
own damages; and the third for punitive damages. A motion to
strike the mother as an improper party in the second count was
granted, and the plaintiffs appealed on the grounds that the
67. Id. at _ 109 So. at 227.
68. Id.
69. 89 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1956).
70. Id. at 506.
71. 279 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1973).
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statutory provision making the father the only proper party
plaintiff was unconstitutional. The Florida court reversed,
holding that the mother was a proper party plaintiff under the
Florida and United States Constitutions. The following state-
ment was made on the elements of 'a parent's recovery:
In Wilkie v. Roberts, this court held that the parent, or
guardian, of an unemancipated minor child, injured by the
tortious act of another, has a cause of action in his own name
for medical, hospital, and related expenditures, indirect eco-
nomic losses such as income lost by the parent in caring for
the child, and for the loss of the child's companionship, and
society, and services including personal services to the parent
and income which the child might earn for the direct and
indirect benefit of the parent.7
Such a clear statement of the law even without a discussion
of policy implications would certainly seem to settle the mat-
ter; however, Florida lawyers were not to be that fortunate.
In 1975, the Florida Court of Appeals decided City Stores
Co. v. Langer.3 A girl and her father brought suit against City
Stores for assault and battery, false imprisonment and mali-
cious prosecution in connection with an alleged shoplifting in-
cident. The girl recovered $45,006.24 in compensatory damages
and $26,000 in punitive damages. Her father recovered $13,000
for expenditures and loss of services of his daughter. On appeal,
the girl's recovery was affirmed, while the father's was reversed
and remanded for a new trial. Noting that the father had had
actual expenditures of only $280, the court stated the damages
rule as follows:
A parent can recover only his pecuniary loss as a result of
injury to his minor child, and such loss was limited to two
elements: (1) the loss of the child's services, and (2) medical
expenses in effecting or attempting to effect a cure. Wilkie v.
Roberts, 91 Fla. 1064, 109 So. 225 (1920). In addition, it has
been recognized that there can be no recovery by a parent in
action for injuries to his minor child, for the suffering, pain,
embarrassment and/or humiliation caused the parent by the
injuries of the child. See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1060 at 1078
(1953); Wilkie v. Roberts, supra; Miami Paper Co. v. John-
ston, Fla. 1952, 58 So. 2d 869; Youngblood v. Taylor, Fla.
1956, 89 So. 2d 503.74
72. Id. at 846.
73. 308 So. 2d 621 (Fla. App. 1975).
74. Id. at 622.
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The court concluded that the excess of the father's award above
the $280 of expenditures proved was for his "inconvenience and
humiliation" and that he could not be allowed to recover such
damages.
The controlling law of Florida is found in their Supreme
Court's decision in Yordon v. Savage and not in the Court of
Appeals decision in City Stores Co. v. Langer, but the latter
opinion, in completely ignoring the Yordon decision, leaves the
state of the law in Florida in doubt. While City Stores Co.,
involving an intentional tort which gave rise to no appreciable
injury to the parent, can be distinguished from Yordon, which
involved negligence, there is no reason to ignore so recent and
definitive a case as Yordon. There may have been no loss of
society and companionship on the part of the father in City
Stores Co., but the rule should have at least been recognized.
D. California
The most recent case on recovery of damages for loss of
society and companionship of a child is the California case of
Hair v. County of Monterey.15 The plaintiffs were the parents
of a nine year old boy who brought suit to recover for injuries
to the child including blindness, brain damage, quadriplegia
and petit and grand mal seizures suffered as a result of oral
surgery performed at the defendant hospital. The parents
sought recovery for:
... the extraordinary care and attention they would provide
for the child; the diminution of the time, care and attention
available for each other and their remaining children; emo-
tional shock and injury to the parents' nervous systems sus-
tained after witnessing the child's injuries; and for the lost
society, companionship, comfort and society of their child.7
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the parents' cause
of action and was affirmed on appeal by the California Court
of Appeals, which held (1) that the parents could recover only
the pecuniary value of additional nursing services; (2) that no
recovery could be had for affection expended; (3) that there
could be no recovery for mental shock in the absence of physi-
cal injury; and, drawing an analogy to the allowance of recov-
ery for loss of consortium by a wife, (4):
75. 45 Cal. App. 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975).
76. Id. at 340, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 640,
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• . . that no reasonable distinction can be drawn between the
right of parents, in appropriate circumstances, to seek recov-
ery of lost comfort, society and companionship of an injured
and totally helpless child and the right of a spouse, in similar
circumstances, to seek recovery for loss of consortium as au-
thorized by Rodriguez [v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974), 12
Cal.3d 382, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669.] 77
The trial court's decision to dismiss was affirmed because
the parents had not joined their action with the child's suit,
which had been concluded in favor of the child before the deci-
sion in the Rodriguez case. In Rodriguez, the California Su-
preme Court held that for a wife to recover for the loss of her
husband's consortium she had to join her suit with his and, in
addition, that the rule of Rodriguez would not apply to cases
concluded prior to the decision therein. The California Court
of Appeals held that since the child's action in Hair was con-
cluded prior to the Rodriguez decision, the parents' action was
barred.
The Hair decision does not make a great deal of sense in
that the California Court of Appeals seems to have arbitrarily
adopted a limitation that was not meant for the case at bar.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's limitation in Shockley v.
Prier" is more reasonable in that it limits application of its rule
to cases arising after the decision date in the case then at bar.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals' statement of the rule gives
rise to questions regarding the scope of its application. What
are "appropriate circumstances" for a parent's recovery? Is the
rule limited to "an injured and totally helpless child?" The
court in Hair is not at all clear on these points.
Unlike most courts that have allowed recovery for loss of an
injured child's society and companionship, the California
Court of Appeals at least alluded to a rationale by way of its
references to the Rodriguez case, likening the recovery in the
case of a child to that of a wife for loss of her husband's consor-
tium. Hayward v. Yost 7 was discussed briefly in favor of the
rule but the main emphasis was on the Rodriguez case.
77. Id. at 545, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
78. 66 Wis. 2d at 404-05, 225 N.W.2d at 501.
79. 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952).
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CONCLUSION
The Shockley case is the first in the country to make any
real attempt to discuss fully the policy and rationale in favor
of allowing parents to recover for the loss of the society and
companionship of their injured minor child. In this it stands as
a model to the rest of the nation. There are problems on proof
of damages and the avoidance of jury speculation and sympa-
thy verdicts, and there is the question of the application of the
statute of limitations to the parents' cause of action if it must
be joined with that of the child. These remain to be settled and
undoubtedly will be in time. For now, the first step is taken and
children, after centuries, are finally becoming fully recognized
persons in the law.
BERNARD T. McCARTAN
